AfD – the alternative for whom? OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 231 | 10.02.2017 by Ciechanowicz, Artur
1OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 231
www.osw.waw.plCentre for Eastern Studies NUMBER 231 | 10.02.2017
AfD – the alternative for whom?
Artur Ciechanowicz
When in 2013 a group of professors of economics founded Alternative for Germany (Alterna-
tive für Deutschland – AfD) it seemed that the name of the new grouping was exaggerated. 
Taking into account its slogans and its leaders, the AfD could at that time be an alternative for 
disenchanted voters of the CDU/CSU and the FDP alone. The party’s ‘founding fathers’, among 
whom there was a large group of former CDU members, did not conceal the fact that their 
ambitions were not particularly far-reaching. Their basic goal was to influence the CDU so that 
it would return to its former conservative values. 
Over less than four years of the AfD’s existence, practically every aspect of the party has 
changed but its name. These aspects included: the leadership, the image, the political plat-
form and the political power base. Professors of economics, who claim that Germany’s Eu-
rozone membership is the country’s main problem, have been replaced with young activists 
focused on identity issues. The party gained an anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic profile and 
began to represent traditional non-voters, instead of disenchanted voters from other parties. 
This evolution turned out to be successful – the AfD representatives sit in the parliaments of 
most federal states and the party is likely to attain representation in the Bundestag after the 
2017 elections. For the German political scene, this will be a shock comparable to the electoral 
success of the Greens’ in 1983.
The consequences of this revolution on the political scene have already been evident at the 
federal state level. The AfD’s presence in state parliaments forces other parties to establish al-
liances against it, which consequently prevents each of these parties from delivering on their 
electoral promises. Meanwhile, the AfD is shaping the public debate by referring to issues 
which other parties until recently considered as taboo. This forces the remaining parties to 
take a stance on these issues and adopt specific legislative solutions. 
A history of success
On 14 April 2013, the founding congress of the 
new party, Alternative for Germany (Alterna-
tive für Deutschland – AfD), was held in Berlin. 
The new movement’s initiators were professors 
of economics critical of the Eurozone, journalists 
and businesspeople centred around Prof. Bernd 
Lucke and Konrad Adam, a former columnist of 
the conservative opinion-forming daily FAZ. The 
new party’s manifesto was written on two pag-
es and contained demands regarding Germa-
ny’s exit from the Eurozone and a return to its 
national currency – the German mark, the dis-
solution of the currency union, increased par-
ticipation of banks in the bearing the costs of 
the financial crisis, more direct democracy and 
a plan to prevent the responsibilities of individu-
al states from being transferred to the EU level1. 
1 AfD Wahlprogramm 2013, 2 January 2017, http://www.
alternative-rlp.de/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/2013_
Wahlprogramm.pdf
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Regardless of its manifesto, the party head-
ed by Bernd Lucke began to build its image as 
a conservative movement distancing itself from 
the political establishment. The party’s repre-
sentatives declared their will to bring a new 
quality to the German political scene by pro-
posing a substantial debate on the possible 
dissolution of the Eurozone. The new party 
solicited for the votes of those individuals who 
were disenchanted with the changes in those 
parties having a conservative (CDU and CSU) or 
liberal (FDP) profile. It also intended to take ad-
vantage of the mounting resistance within so-
ciety towards the costs of saving Greece. This is 
confirmed by voting statistics showing the flow 
of voters from other parties to the AfD in the 
election to the Bundestag held on 22 Septem-
ber 2013, in which the new party won 4.7% of 
the votes and the required threshold was 5%. 
The AfD voters included mainly former support-
ers of the FDP, the Left Party and Christian Dem-
ocratic parties. High approval ratings of the AfD 
among the Left Party’s supporters indicate that 
the vote for the AfD was intended as a protest 
against the policy pursued by the government.
The European Parliament election held on 25 
May 2014 turned out to be another success 
for the AfD. Alternative for Germany won 7% 
of the votes and brought seven deputies to the 
European Parliament. The stunningresult by this 
Eurosceptic party is not merely a product of its 
political platform2 but also of its focus in the 
pre-election campaign on a new issue, i.e. immi-
grants abusing social benefits. The topic turned 
out to be popular – the Bavarian CSU tried to 
capitalise on it in its campaign and so did Ange-
la Merkel herself a few days before the election. 
The European Parliament election has shown 
that a vote for AfD is not a wasted vote, yet 
at the same time a dispute within the party 
was revealed. It involved the conservative- 
2 Programm der Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) für 
die Wahl zum Europäischen Parlament am 25. Mai 
2014, 2 January 2017, https://www.alternativefuer.
de/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2014/03/Europapro-
gramm-der-AfD.pdf
-liberal group centred around Bernd Lucke and 
the conservative-national group, the so-called 
Patriotic Platform, represented by Frauke Petry, 
one of the three co-chairs of the party. She 
demanded a greater presence of patriotic 
and identity-oriented elements in the AfD’s 
narrative. Until mid-2015, Lucke had man-
aged to manoeuvre between the two wings. 
The mounting internal dissonance undermined 
the party’s credibility but not to an extent which 
would disable it from installing its representa-
tives in subsequent federal state parliaments. 
Back in 2014, the Alternative for Germany had 
brought its representatives to the state parlia-
ments in Saxony, Thuringia and Brandenburg, 
and at the beginning of 2015 its representa-
tives were elected to the first western federal 
states – Hamburg and Bremen. These elections 
showed that the party was becoming increas-
ingly able to mobilise traditional non-voters, 
which was due to the expansion of their man-
ifesto to include issues such as pro-family poli-
cy, education, energy issues, immigration and – 
in Saxony – cross-border crime. 
The string of electoral successes in specific fed-
eral states consolidated the party for a short 
time but it did not eliminate the divisions. 
These returned, for example, during a vote 
in the European Parliament on the sanctions 
against Russia. Bernd Lucke, who voted for 
the sanctions, had to face open criticism from 
his deputies and demands for his resignation 
voiced by more radical groups of ordinary party 
members. The actions by Bernd Lucke aimed at 
disciplining the national-conservative activists 
and, at the same time, at resolving the conflict 
The European Parliament election has 
shown that a vote for AfD is not a wasted 
vote and this has been the beginning of 
a string of AfD electoral successes in 
federal state parliaments.
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(by launching the procedure of removing one 
activist from the party and reducing the number 
of party co-chairs to two) proved ineffective. 
Meanwhile, the good election result attracted 
new individuals wishing to become party mem-
bers. In mid-2015, the party already had 22 000 
members, while Lucke and his supporters could 
count on the loyalty of some 3 000 of them3. 
Ahead of the party’s federal congress in Essen 
(on 4-5 July 2015), the heads of AfD structures 
in Saxony, Brandenburg and Thuringia, and also 
North Rhine-Westphalia, grouped in an associ-
ation operating within the party, referred to as 
the Patriotic Platform, demanded that the AfD 
adopt a more critical stance towards immigrants 
and refugees. They expressed their support for 
the anti-Islamic Pegida movement, demanded 
that sanctions against Russia be lifted and be-
gan to openly claim that the USA is co-respon-
sible for the war in Ukraine and in Syria. During 
the party congress, certain changes to the lead-
ership structure were made. Frauke Petry, the 
head of AfD in Saxony, and Jörg Meuthen, the 
AfD leader in Baden-Wurttemberg, who was 
associated with Bernd Lucke’s group, became 
the party’s co-chairs. Lucke himself left the par-
ty claiming that he did not intend to lend his 
name to the party’s new, more populist orien-
tation. Numerous ordinary party members and 
local AfD leaders, mainly from western Germa-
ny, followed suit. In total, around 20% of par-
ty members left the AfD at that time. The loss 
was quickly compensated by an inflow of new 
activists; after Bernd Lucke’s departure the AfD 
considerably improved its election results in 
subsequent federal state elections.
The unstable leadership
The relatively weak position of the party’s lead-
ers is typical of Alternative for Germany. This is 
caused by three factors: 
3 Jetzt sollen die Mitglieder entscheiden, 2 January 2017, 
http://www.stuttgarter-zeitung.de/inhalt.kein-ende-
der-afd-querelen-jetzt-sollen-die-mitglieder-entscheid-
en.169f0a4b-e31f-4dcb-9d8c-95a911d3b635.html
Formal. Intending to build an image of a plu-
ralist, democratic and ideologically diverse 
movement, the party’s founders decided that 
it will be headed by three leaders of equal sta-
tus. Despite this, Bernd Lucke, being the ‘face’ 
of the party, tried to rule it independently on 
his own. The AfD’s successes in eastern federal 
states contributed to party members becoming 
increasingly unwilling to accept Bernd Lucke’s 
leadership. It was being challenged in particular 
by Frauke Petry – his rival, one of the party’s co-
chairs and the head of the party organisation in 
Saxony. One of the reasons why Petry was able 
to effectively challenge Lucke’s leadership was 
that her formal status within the party struc-
ture was equal to that of Lucke. Although the 
number of co-chairs was reduced from three 
to two, when the new duumvirate was formed 
the rivalry flared up anew. Despite Lucke’s de-
parture, the AfD continues to be riddled with 
conflict within its leadership. At present, Frauke 
Petry’s main rival (in terms of the position held) 
is the AfD’s co-chair Jörg Meuthen. Two-per-
son party leadership is no exception in German 
politics. The Greens and the Left Party are also 
headed by two co-chairs. However, this mod-
el is equally being challenged in these parties 
(also by the co-chairs themselves).
Ideological. Like any other party in the early 
stages of its existence, the AfD attracted indi-
viduals whose views are frequently divergent. 
From the very beginning the party had two 
main wings: the liberal-conservative one and 
the national-conservative one. The background 
of the struggle for power between Bernd Lucke 
and Frauke Petry lay in their approach to the 
Dresden-based Pegida movement (Patriot-
ic Europeans against the Islamisation of the 
West). Lucke considered Pegida a xenophobic, 
The weak position of the party leaders 
is typical of Alternative for Germany.
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islamophobic, non-bourgeois movement and 
distanced himself from it, while activists from 
eastern federal states, who supported Petry, 
were of the opinion that support should be of-
fered to participants in the protests organised 
by Pegida. 
Personnel. The present temporary alliances 
indicate that the ongoing conflicts are increas-
ingly focused on the ambitions of local leaders 
rather than on ideological issues. In summer 
2016, Petry supported the rebellion by a por-
tion of AfD deputies to the state parliament 
in Baden-Wurttemberg against Jörg Meuthen, 
meaning to weaken his position or even force 
him to resign from the function he held in the 
party. Ultimately, Meuthen emerged as the 
victor in this battle, owing to the support he 
received from Alexander Gauland, the head 
of the AfD in Brandenburg, regardless of the 
differences in these two politicians’ ideological 
affiliations. The goal adopted by Gauland and 
the national-conservative (André Poggenburg 
– Saxony-Anhalt, Björn Höcke – Thuringia) and 
moderate activists (Armin-Paul Hampel – Low-
er Saxony) associated with him is to prevent 
Frauke Petry from being nominated by the AfD 
as a candidate for chancellor.
The excessive internal diversity
The unending leadership crisis within the AfD is 
an element of a broader phenomenon involving 
a constant reshuffle of executive posts at lower 
levels of the party structure. At the state, re-
gional and local levels this reshuffle has slightly 
different causes than at the federal level. Para-
doxically, the main reason behind the person-
nel reshuffle has been the successful creation of 
party structures at a record pace. Shortly after 
its establishment in 2013, the AfD had 10 000 
members, according to its own figures. At the 
end of 2013, the number reached 17 000 and 
in mid-2015 22 000. At present, the number of 
party members is estimated at 18 000 – 22 000. 
Due to the fact that it was not possible to verify 
the candidates in detail, executive posts were 
frequently taken by individuals with no organ-
isational skills or who in their earlier lives had 
episodes of other, sometimes compromising, 
political activity. Matthias Wohlfarth was ap-
pointed the first leader of the state-level AfD 
structures in Thuringia. He was a member of 
an evangelical sect and used his party position 
to pursue his missionary work. In Hesse, the 
party leader Peter Münch concealed his for-
mer activity in the Republicans party (Die Re-
publikaner) which has been categorised by the 
Federal Office for the Protection of the Consti-
tution as an extremist party.
Comprehensive vetting of party members to 
check their former activity is inevitable for the 
AfD. Regular announcements regarding remov-
al from the party of individuals involved, for ex-
ample, in actions by neo-Nazi groups or other 
related groups suggest that this may pose a se-
rious problem for the party in the future. It may 
trigger scandals such as those surrounding the 
Left Party activists, who concealed their former 
cooperation with the East German security ser-
vice – the Stasi. The emphasis the AfD places in 
its programme on direct democracy translates 
into the model of decision making within the 
party itself. The AfD party conventions (at vari-
ous levels) tend to take the form of assemblies 
of party members instead of party delegates. 
Considering that so far the Alternative has not 
developed any networks of inter-relations or 
formed permanent factions based on long-
term goals and interests, discipline is not the 
appropriate word to describe the actions of the 
party members (in contrast to the CDU for ex-
ample). This is why the results of such meetings 
are sometimes surprising, similarly to the short-
lived protest party – the Pirate Party.
Due to the fact that it was not possible to 
verify the candidates in detail, executive 
posts were frequently taken up by indi-
viduals with no organisational skills.
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The party’s manifesto as the list 
of the nation’s problems
The AfD is frequently compared with the Pirate 
Party for other reasons. It is often claimed to 
be a ‘single issue party’, i.e. it is focused pre-
dominantly on the anti-immigrant narrative. 
This has not been the case since at least May 
2016, which was when a 95-page-long party 
manifesto was adopted, containing the par-
ty’s stance on all the major areas of politics4. 
When compared with the initial (slogan-based) 
party manifestos, it mainly reveals a shift from 
conservative-liberal views towards more radical 
ones. This is due to the fact that a portion of 
party members with moderate views left it and 
that in the second half of 2015, in connection 
with the migration crisis, the political climate 
changed and matters other than the Eurozone 
crisis appeared on the agenda. 
Although the former manifesto contained 
statements objecting to immigration to Ger-
many that is motivated by the desire to take 
advantage of the German welfare system, in-
cluding from EU countries, at the same time 
it recognized the right to seek asylum as one 
of the fundamental rights. In its present man-
ifesto, the AfD proposes that the right to seek 
asylum be removed from the chapter of the 
constitution regarding fundamental rights, in 
order to eliminate the instances of this right be-
ing abused. Moreover, Alternative for Germany 
wants the applications for international protec-
tion to be submitted in the applicant’s coun-
try of origin only. To achieve this, it proposes 
the creation of special centres, such as in north 
Africa, for example, under the auspices of the 
UN, the EU or Germany itself. Individuals who 
submitted their applications for international 
protection in Germany would be sent to these 
centres to await their decision there. 
4 Grundsatzprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland, 
2 January 2017, https://www.alternativefuer.de/wp-con-
tent/uploads/sites/7/2016/03/Leitantrag-Grundsatzpro-
gramm-AfD.pdf
The AfD’s manifesto presented ahead of the 
2014 European Parliament election contained 
references to Western culture as the basis for 
German identity. However, it did not contain 
the word “Islam”. The manifesto announced on 
1 May 2016 contains demands regarding a ban 
on foreign funding of mosques, a ban on wom-
en wearing full-face veils, a ban on female pub-
lic servants, teachers and schoolgirls wearing 
head scarves, a ban on constructing minarets, 
on the call of the muezzin and on ritual slaugh-
ter of animals. Muslim organisations should not 
be granted public juridical person status (which 
would enable them to apply for funding from 
taxes paid by Muslims). According to the AfD, 
Islam is not a facet of German culture and the 
rising number of Muslims is one of the biggest 
challenges the German state faces. Specific fac-
tions within the party agree on this issue, they 
only differ in their assessments of the threats 
posed by Islam (or Muslims) – whether these 
are political, cultural or demographic threats. 
The manifesto contains large passages on 
a pro-family policy, promoting the traditional 
family model intended to counteract the unfa-
vourable demographic trends. This is accom-
panied by criticism of the equal rights policy, 
gender issues, gender parity and “wrongly un-
derstood” feminism. The party also opposes 
abortion being financed from public funds.
The party’s manifesto devotes considerable at-
tention to the crisis in the EU and in the Euro-
zone, which inspired the creation of the AfD. 
The party proposes that the EU should return 
competences to individual states and claims 
that EU institutions (such as the EU Council, the 
European Commission and the European Par-
It is claimed that the AfD is a ‘single is-
sue party’, but its manifesto contains 
the party’s stance on all the major areas 
of politics.
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liament) have too much ability to influence the 
policy of specific states despite the lack of suf-
ficient democratic legitimacy. Should this de-
mand not be met, the AfD proposes that Ger-
many leave the EU or that the EU be dissolved 
and a new economic cooperation structure be 
created. According to the AfD, Germany should 
leave the Eurozone and should the Bundestag 
fail to vote in favour of this exit, the party will 
propose a referendum regarding this issue 
(which would require changes to Germany’s 
constitution since it does not provide for a ref-
erendum being organised at the federal level).
The AfD claims that only sovereign states, and 
not supranational organisations, are able to 
meet their citizen’ expectations regarding their 
rights, freedoms and sense of security. The par-
ty has interpreted the results of the British EU 
exit referendum as confirmation of its narra-
tive. Plans were announced to organise a simi-
lar referendum over ‘Dexit’ in Germany. Euros-
cepticism is a common ground for agreement 
between the AfD, the National Front headed 
by Marine Le Pen and the United Kingdom In-
dependence Party. The two MEPs elected from 
AfD lists, who did not leave the party, are Beat-
rix von Storch and Marcus Pretzell. The former is 
a member of the Europe of Freedom and Direct 
Democracy group (in which the main political 
parties are the British UKIP and the Italian Five 
Star Movement) and the latter belongs to the 
Europe of Nations and Freedom group (in which 
the National Front is the largest component).
In the section of its manifesto devoted to for-
eign and security policy the AfD proposes re-
constructing a strong and independent position 
for Germany in the international arena. This is 
to be achieved, for example, by obtaining per-
manent membership of the UN Security Coun-
cil, checking each time whether Germany’s in-
volvement in specific NATO activities is in line 
with Germany’s interests and strengthening 
the Bundeswehr. Unlike the Left Party, the AfD 
agrees that Germany’s membership of NATO 
is in Germany’s interest. However, only on the 
condition that NATO constitutes a defence al-
liance. The AfD opposes the establishment of 
a European army and sees it as another step 
towards transforming the EU into a superstate. 
The manifesto emphasises the importance of 
relations with Russia (“security in Europe is im-
possible without Russia”) and suggests that it 
would be necessary for Germany to become 
more independent of the USA. This is seen as 
a precondition for Germany to be able to repre-
sent its own interests in the international arena 
instead of Washington’s interests.
In connection with Donald Trump’s electoral 
victory, the party is hoping for a change in the 
“balance of involvement” in trans-Atlantic rela-
tions (by which it means that the USA’s hegem-
onic ambitions should be replaced with cooper-
ation between equal partners) and for putting 
an end to the conflicts in Ukraine and in Syria 
(with Russia’s involvement in peace-making 
processes)5. Previous statements by AfD politi-
cians suggest that they see the USA, not Russia, 
as the biggest threat to global peace. Hence the 
regular appeals for lifting the sanctions against 
Russia, recognising it as a partner in the fight 
against terrorism, expressing understanding 
for the Kremlin’s point of view and criticism of 
the ‘deterrence strategy’ which NATO uses to-
wards Russia6. The AfD emphasises that it was 
the USA’s policy that destabilised the Middle 
East, which in turn triggered the influx of immi-
grants to Germany. The AfD strongly objects to 
Turkey’s membership of the EU. Neither Poland 
5 Petry: Trump hat die Karten zur politischen Zeitenwende 
in der Hand, 3 January 2017, https://www.alternative-
fuer.de/petry-trump-hat-die-karten-zur-politischen-
zeitenwende-in-der-hand/
6 Pazderski: Dialog mit Russland statt Abschreckung, 
3 January 2017, https://www.alternativefuer.de/pazder-
ski-dialog-mit-russland-statt-abschreckung/
The AfD emphasises the importance 
of relations with Russia and the need 
for Germany to be more independent of 
the USA.
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nor other Central European countries are men-
tioned in the AfD’s manifesto. However, AfD 
politicians frequently refer to the behaviour 
of the Visegrad Group states in the migration 
crisis as a model and see the criticism offered 
by Brussels as an example of EU institutions’ 
hypocrisy7. 
In similarity with earlier versions, the present 
manifesto contains numerous demands typical 
of parties with a liberal economic profile. These 
include curbing bureaucracy, withdrawal of the 
state from subsidising specific sectors of the 
economy, simplification of the tax system and 
the social insurance system. For example, the 
party supports the maintaining of minimum 
wage and increased support from the state for 
large families. The AfD all but rejects trade lib-
eralisation agreements such as TTIP.
The main features of the AfD’s manifesto are its 
temporary nature and concise phrasing. When 
defining challenges, it resembles a journalistic 
commentary on those events which occupied 
the minds of the German public from 2013– 
–2016 (both important ones such as the migra-
tion crisis and less prominent ones such as the 
presence of toxic substances in toys). The prob-
lems considered are accompanied by proposed 
specific solutions which indicate what the party 
supports (and not merely what it objects to). 
These actions are proof of the effort intended 
to facilitate the formation of a secure base of 
voters, so that the party does not have to rely 
on protest votes.
Although, as far as its platform is concerned, the 
Alternative is not a party focused on one issue, 
it does tactically focus on individual topics. It is 
typical of this party to concentrate on concerns 
which ignite the most fervent emotions among 
its voters (in 2013 – the Eurozone crisis, in 2014 
– illegal immigration, in 2015 – the threat posed 
by Islam, in 2015/2016 – the migration crisis), 
7 Der Traum der AfD von der Visegrad-Connection, 3 Jan-
uary 2017, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/ar-
ticle157777404/Der-Traum-der-AfD-von-der-Visegrad-
Connection.html
in order to deliberately break a taboo, to use 
controversial rhetoric and to take a stance 
in opposition to that of the government.
The stable voter base
The AfD is frequently referred to as a protest 
party. The argument that voters do not vote 
specifically for the AfD but against other parties 
is indeed borne out, at least in some statistics. 
One piece of evidence for the lack of a perma-
nent voter base may be the party’s different 
approval ratings recorded in specific surveys, 
depending on whether the public debate was 
at a given moment dominated by one particular 
subject inspired by some crisis. The AfD record-
ed high approval ratings in the period when the 
Eurozone crisis aggravated, when the perceived 
threat posed by radical Islamists increased, 
when the migrant crisis broke out and imme-
diately after actual or attempted terror attacks.
Research regarding the motivation to vote for 
the AfD in individual federal state elections has 
shown that a portion of voters supported the 
Alternative to express their dissatisfaction with 
other parties. In the 2016 elections to the state 
parliament in Baden-Wurttemberg, 70% of the 
voters who supported the AfD indicated their 
disenchantment with other parties as the rea-
son behind their choice; the corresponding pro-
portion in Saxony-Anhalt was 64%.
Alongside this, research conducted under the 
socio-economic panel (SOEP, an annual re-
search study carried out since 1984 on a group 
of around 30  000 respondents), measuring, 
among other issues, long-term loyalty towards 
specific parties, shows that the AfD has man-
As far as its platform is concerned, the 
AfD is no longer a ‘single issue party’. 
However, it can tactically focus on indi-
vidual topics.
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aged to build a stable electorate of 5–6% 
(i.e. comparable to the average approval ratings 
of the FDP over many years and much higher 
than the level of support for neo-Nazi parties 
such as the NPD or the DVU). However, support 
for the AfD as recorded in SOEP is significant-
ly lower than in regular short-term polls meas-
uring the level of support for specific political 
parties. This confirms the argument that a por-
tion of AfD voters are volatile voters who vote 
against other parties. It also shows that the AfD 
has become the alternative for those voters who 
do not have a party that they could vote for. 
This is a starting point which the AfD could use 
to build a permanent presence on the German 
political scene. This potential is also evident in 
how effective the Alternative is when it tries to 
mobilise traditional non-voters. For compari-
son: in the 2014 elections in Brandenburg the 
AfD won 12 000 votes by former non-voters, in 
the 2016 elections in Saxony-Anhalt – 101 000. 
Both federal states have a similar population.
The roots of its success
The following factors and strategic decisions 
have contributed to the AfD’s successes to date:
• The process of ‘social-democratisation’ of the 
CDU, which has been progressing since 2005 
(the consent for minimum wage, dual citizen-
ship, gender parity, resignation from obligatory 
military service) and the emergence of a polit-
ical vacuum on the right of the political spec-
trum adjacent to the Christian Democrats. 
• The initial boycott by the CDU, which ena-
bled the AfD to wage its campaign with relative 
ease, as nobody pointed to the contradictions 
in the AfD’s promises or its internal conflicts. 
• Initiating debates on certain issues which 
broke taboos or were on the brink of German 
political correctness, combined with the party’s 
image having escaped any associations with 
the neo-Nazi part of the political spectrum.
• Being transformed from a ‘single issue par-
ty’ to a party with a comprehensive vision of 
changes, formulated in the manifesto it would 
like to follow in Germany.
• The turn to the right. Initially, it seemed that 
the change of leadership and Frauke Petry’s 
empowerment meant the end of the AfD and 
that the party would not be able to retain its 
former voters. This was confirmed in polls: in 
July 2015, the AfD’s approval ratings fell from 
the fixed 5–6% recorded over several months 
to 3%. Data regarding the flow of voters sug-
gests that initially the AfD attracted the voters 
of all the remaining parties, mainly the CDU, 
the Left Party and the FDP. As its political plat-
form evolved, the share of other parties’ voters 
in the AfD’s electorate began to dwindle and 
the party is increasingly effective in mobilising 
traditional non-voters. The turn to the right, 
which de facto happened in July 2015 and was 
sealed with the publication of the party’s elec-
toral manifesto less than a year later, turned 
out to be a sound move from the point of view 
of the party’s political strategy.
• The knowledge of local reality, problems and 
needs in those federal states in which the party 
has representation in the local parliaments. In the 
context of election campaign practice this meant 
that the federal-level AfD politicians took efforts 
to promote the AfD’s image as a moderate par-
ty in supraregional media, essentially leaving 
more radical activists free to act at a local level. 
The party’s result in the 2016 elections in Ber-
lin was particularly significant. The double-digit 
support recorded in Berlin (14.2%) shows that 
the party is also able to win votes in liberal big 
cities with a traditionally left-leaning electorate.
The AfD has managed to build a stable 
electorate of 5–6%, i.e. comparable to 
the average approval ratings of the FDP 
over many years and much higher than 
the level of support for neo-Nazi parties 
such as the NPD or the DVU.
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The party of the ‘average citizen’
So far, the AfD has not been considered a po-
tential coalition partner. However, the party is 
exerting a tangible influence on German poli-
tics – its presence on the political scene forces 
other parties to make coalition alliances ‘of con-
venience’ and, as a consequence, to abandon 
some of their electoral promises. In this situa-
tion, the AfD is winning further supporters.
After less than four years since it was estab-
lished, the AfD has representation in the par-
liaments of ten of the 16 German federal states 
and in the European Parliament. The AfD failed 
to cross the electoral threshold in just two 
of the elections in which it has run to date – 
in Hesse and in the 2013 Bundestag election.
The polls (measuring both long- and short-term 
support for specific parties) indicate that AfD 
representatives will get elected to the Bun-
destag in the 2017 election. Considering how 
AfD politicians have behaved so far, the party 
is unlikely to be a relentless opposition. In line 
with Alexander Gauland’s idea, the Alternative 
wants to be a party of the ‘average citizen’, and 
therefore it will not automatically reject pro-
posals for cooperation from other parties (in-
cluding the Left Party), on the condition that 
this cooperation could be presented as efforts 
to improve the life of the average citizen. This 
rhetoric will confirm the party’s desired image 
as an anti-establishment party acting against 
the logic of party interests, and at the same 
time – as a moderate party which mainstream 
voters could trust. 
AfD’s presence in federal state parliaments
Federal state and election date Election result
Saxony – 31 August 2014 9.7%
Brandenburg – 14 September 2014 12.2%
Thuringia – 14 September 2014 10.6%
Hamburg – 15 February 2015 6.1%
Bremen – 10 May 2015 5.5%
Saxony-Anhalt – 13 March 2016 24.2%
Rhineland-Palatinate – 13 March 2016 12.6%
Baden-Wurttemberg – 13 March 2016 15.1%
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern – 4 September 2016 20.8%
Berlin – 18 September 2016 14.2%
APPENDIX
The AfD’s major figures 
Frauke Petry (b. 1975 in Dresden) – co-chair of 
the party, head of the AfD faction in the local 
parliament in Saxony and of the party organi-
sation there. She studied chemistry in Reading 
(UK) and in Göttingen. In 2004, she was award-
ed the degree of Doctor of Chemistry. In 2007–
–2013, she ran her own company manufactur-
ing polyurethane for sealing tyres, which she 
herself invented. She has won several awards 
in business innovation contests. In 2013, she 
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had to declare bankruptcy. Her company was 
acquired by a consortium of investors and con-
tinues to operate. Petry has been associated 
with the AfD from the beginning of the party’s 
existence. In April 2013, at the AfD’s founding 
congress she was appointed one of the three 
co-chairs of the party (next to Bernd Lucke and 
Konrad Adam). In July 2015, following an in-
ternal dispute between the national-conserva-
tive and the conservative-liberal wings, Petry, 
one of the main representatives of the former 
wing, was elected the party’s chairperson. Jörg 
Meuthen was elected co-chair.
Jörg Meuthen (b. 1966 in Essen) – co-chair of 
the party, head of the AfD faction in the local 
parliament in Baden-Wurttemberg and of the 
party organisation there. After 1989 he worked 
as economics lecturer at various universities. 
He belongs to the conservative-liberal wing 
of the party and, as he himself claims, intends 
to counterbalance the more radical members 
of the party.
Alexander Gauland (b. 1941 in Chemnitz) 
– deputy chair of the party, head of the AfD 
faction in the local parliament in Brandenburg 
and of the party organisation there. He studied 
political science and law in Marburg, where he 
earned his doctoral degree. Between 1973 and 
2013 he was a member of the CDU. His profes-
sional career has included jobs in the Frankfurt 
city hall, in the federal Ministry for the Environ-
ment, and in 1987–1991 he was head of the 
office of the minister-president of Hesse. After 
Germany’s reunification, between 1991 and 
2005, he held several posts in the Maerkische 
Allgemeine Zeitung daily. Gauland was one of 
the founders of the AfD. He belongs to the na-
tional-conservative wing of the party. Howev-
er, he mainly represents the party’s intellectual 
background. He is the party’s ideologist.
Beatrix von Storch (Beatrix Amelie Ehrengard 
Eilika, Duchess of Oldenburg, b. 1971 in Lübeck) 
– deputy chair of the party, member of the Eu-
ropean Parliament, head of the party organisa-
tion in Berlin. She studied law in Heidelberg and 
Lausanne. Until 2011 she worked as a lawyer in 
Berlin. Since the mid-1990s she has established 
several associations with different goals includ-
ing the compensation for and return of plots 
of land to former owners affected by the agri-
cultural and industrial reform in the Soviet oc-
cupation zone (Göttinger Kreis and Allianz für 
den Rechtsstaat), promotion of citizens’ political 
activity (Zivile Koalition), involvement for trans-
parency in public life (Abgeordneten-Check.de). 
Former member of the FDP. A member of the 
Alternative for Germany from the beginning of 
the party’s existence. Beatrix von Storch’s main 
task in the AfD involves lobbying. 
Albrecht Glaser (b. 1942 in Worms) – depu-
ty chair of the party. Between 1970 and 2012 
he was a member of the CDU and held various 
posts in local administration in Hesse. The AfD’s 
candidate for president in the 2017 election. 
Marcus Pretzell (b. 1973 in Rinteln) – MEP and 
leader of the AfD in North Rhine-Westphalia. 
Following his studies in Heidelberg he worked 
as a lawyer in the construction and develop-
ment sector. He does not belong to the nation-
al-conservative wing of the party, although he 
is a supporter of the “identitarian” movement. 
In his private life, he is married to the party’s 
leader Frauke Petry. 
Armin-Paul Hampel (b. 1957 in Bielefeld) – 
member of the party’s governing body and 
head of AfD in Lower Saxony. A prominent TV 
journalist. He used to work as parliamentary 
reporter and foreign correspondent. Used to 
be the head of the TV station ARD’s bureau in 
Delhi. He is associated with the more moderate 
wing of the AfD. 
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Georg Pazderski (b. 1951 in Pirmasens) – mem-
ber of the party’s governing body and chairman 
of the AfD faction in the chamber of deputies in 
Berlin, co-chair of the party in Berlin. A retired 
Bundeswehr colonel. 
André Poggenburg (b. 1975 in Weissenfels) – 
member of the party’s governing body, head of 
the AfD faction in the local parliament in Saxo-
ny-Anhalt and of the party organisation there. 
One of the initiators of the AfD’s turn to the 
right, as a result of which Bernd Lucke, the par-
ty’s founder, and his supporters left the party.
Björn Höcke (b. 1972 in Luenen) – co-chair of 
the AfD in Thuringia and head of the AfD fac-
tion in Thuringia’s local parliament. A teacher 
by profession. Despite not holding any promi-
nent position in the party hierarchy at the fed-
eral level, he is one of the AfD’s main figures 
because he attracts extreme right voters to the 
party. He enjoys considerable support from par-
ty activists in eastern Germany. He is frequently 
criticised for his views, including by fellow par-
ty members. The party’s former leadership had 
previously launched a procedure to expel him 
from the party. It was cancelled when Frauke 
Petry became the AfD’s leader.
